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The paper explains time – inconsistent preferences by particularly focusing on the concept of reference 
dependence. The objective is to propose a short survey on various features of reference dependence and 
different causes that lead to the change of reference level. The emphasis of the paper is on the interpretation of 
the concepts and their behavioral implications. JEL Code: D9 
 
 
1. Time – inconsistent behaviors 
 
A standard assumption in economics is that individuals exhibit time-consistent preferences.  Simply 
stated, inter-temporal marginal rates of substitution remain constant over time and are equal to the 
discount factor. However, ample evidence demonstrates that individuals sometimes exhibit a transient 
change in their preference. For example, before going to a restaurant, the individual may have in mind a 
low-carbohydrate dish consistent to her/his recurring dietary preference. However, upon arriving at the 
restaurant, the person may not be able to resist the temptation of pasta and instead orders a high-carb 
entrée.  Such inconsistent behaviors may be observed throughout a range of everyday activities and have 
implications in a variety of economic problems.  
 
Procrastination is a very familiar behavior to all of us. Almost everyone puts off some duty or activity to 
some future time, sometimes with little reward or reason.  While in some instances, the individual may 
gain a slight benefit (such as sleeping in or gaining an additional half-hour for lunch), the triviality of the 
reward may imply that the procrastinator is simply lazy.  The individuals often procrastinate on seemingly 
significant tasks such as writing reports. This form of procrastination incurs immediate costs and delayed 
rewards. The cost of working today seems more salient than the cost of performing the same task 
tomorrow. In another words, benefits gained today weigh more than the same benefits gained tomorrow.  
  
To explain such behavior, Akerlof (1991) offered a salience-cost model, in which one chose t*to 
minimizeV = c(1+ δ) − (T − t*)x  for t* = t  and minimize V = c − (T − t*)x  for t +1≤ t* < T . The 
model contains the following features: a salient present which creates a temporary preference for the short 
term; at each period t there is salient costs δc  for undertaking the job rather than later; the daily benefit 
from undertaking the job, x , is small; irrational expectation about one’s decision in the future; an 
individual task. Akerlof demonstrates that with a salient cost today and no salient tomorrow, one always 
postpones the action even though an immediate action maximizes utility.  
 
Motivated by Akerlof’s model, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) furthered the examination of 
procrastinating a task with salient costs by allowing expectation to be rational or naïve. They have shown 
that naïve people would procrastinate on activities with immediate costs and preproperate the activities 
with immediate rewards, and sophistication would lessen the effect of procrastination, but deepen the 
effect of preproperation. However, in both Akerlof and O’Donogue-Rabin models, it is assumed that the 
tasks are indivisible and there is only one type of discounting.  
 
Fisher (1999) explored the issue of procrastination by considering a divisible task and two types of 
discounting: hyperbolic discounting and differential discounting. Hyperbolic discounting relates to a 
salient present, that is, short-term discount rates are higher than long-term ones; while differential 
discounting arises from salient costs, which implies that utility from leisure is discounted at a higher rate 
than rewards from work. The results show that both types of discounting cause people to do more work in 
the future. However, with differential discounting one would work harder as a deadline nears while with 
hyperbolic discounting one works steadily from day to day. 
 
Habit formation and addiction are another time-inconsistent behavior that may be witnessed in those 
who partake of substances and/or actions which often prove ruinous to their health and well-being. Such 
activities not only include the consumption of drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes, but also actions such as 
working, eating, gambling, and spending.  
 
Most “habit-formation” models assume that a current consumption has some influence on future 
behaviors (Duesenberry, 1952; Pollak, 1970; Stigler and Beck, 1977). Becker and Murphy (1988) first 
introduced the unstable steady-state consumption levels caused by strong complementarities between two 
period consumptions in addiction. They showed that individuals who discount the future are more likely 
to exhibit addiction behavior. Additionally, they showed that permanent changes in prices of addictive 
goods may have modest short-run effects on the consumption of addictive goods, which may be the 
reason why addicts do not often respond to drastic changes in price. Later on, the result was supported 
empirically by Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1991, 1994). 
 
Shi (2006) built habit formation into a principal-agent model. She presented a dynamic principal-agent 
model based on a habit process in which the worker falls into a productive work path because of a higher 
initial productivity level. The primary purpose of the paper was to discover to what extent that habit 
formation influenced the principal-agent interaction and how that might account for some facts regarding 
training, trial period compensation systems, and graduate school class settings. In the model, the utility of 
the manager is: 
 
 Ut  = Wt – C(xt) – (xt – xt-1)v(xt-1)    if xt  ≥ xt-1         and  
 Ut = Wt – C(xt)                  if xt < xt-1 
 
where (xt – xt-1) is the change of productivity from the last period. When the manager works harder this 
period (which is the case xt ≥ xt-1), he has to exert extra effort to adapt to the new working style in addition 
to the effort he had to put into the work anyway. This extra disutility not only depends on the increase of 
productivity, but also the reference level of productivity v(xt), which measures the marginal effects of the 
change of productivities. When the last period’s productivity is very high, the changes seem negligible 
since the increase of the productivity is trivial compared with previous productivity. The result 
demonstrates how setting up a workload in the period often seen in training and trail period compensation 
system, plays an important role when the worker was previously nonproductive. It is because the 
productive habit, created by locking the worker into a productive path, leads her/him to an optimal 
working path which could never be reached when there was no fixed level of productivity. The model of 
the paper captures the concept of diminishing sensitivity, which is the one of the important features of 
reference dependence.  
 
2. Reference dependence  
 
The concept of reference dependence is a familiar one to social scientists. Research shows that human 
beings are more sensitive to changes which deal with reference levels than those which include absolute 
values (Helson 1964). Interestingly, these changes are asymmetric. For example, it is more difficult for 
most individuals to adapt to a frugal style of living from a life of luxury than vice-a-versa.  
 
2.1 Loss aversion 
 
One pervasive feature of reference dependence is loss aversion, that is, people are significantly more 
averse to losses than they are attracted to same-sized gains (Kahnemen, Jack Knetsch and Thaler 1990 
and Tversky and Kahneman 1991). Loss aversion says that the value abruptly changes the slope at the 
reference level. For instance, most people prefer their status quo to a 50/50 bet of losing $10 or gaining 
$11. The standard concave-utility function simply cannot explain such behavior. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) presented a reference-dependence theory of consumer choice, which 
explains such behavior by a determination of indifference curves about the reference point. The major 
assumption of the theory is that losses and disadvantages have a larger impact on preferences than gains 
and advantages. In the paper, Tversky and Kahneman defined loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity in 
terms of “preference orders”. 
 
Loss aversion is also related to endowment effect identified by Thaler (1980), which states that once a 
person possesses a good, she/he immediately values it more than before possessing it. Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) illustrated this phenomenon in a series of experiments. They randomly gave 
mugs (worth $5 each) to one group of students. This group of students had the option of selling it at a 
price acceptable to them. The result indicated that their decision for prices ranged from .50¢ to $9.50. 
They called the first group sellers. Another group of students were not given mugs directly, but rather had 
the option of receiving either a mug or a sum of money. It was shown that the preferences between a mug 
and a sum of money ranged between .50¢ to $9.50. They called the second group choosers. The sellers 
and choosers faced precisely the same problem between a mug and a sum of money, but they had 
different reference states. The sellers treated the mug as their possession or endowment and experienced a 
loss by giving up the mug, whereas the choosers felt a sensation of status quo by leaving without a mug. 
So leaving without a mug was considered a loss to sellers, but merely kept a point of reference for 
choosers. 
 
Loss aversion implies that the value of a mug against money is higher to the sellers. Indeed, the median 
value of the mug was $7.12 for the sellers and $3.12 for the choosers. The difference is due to the 
endowment effect.  
 
The behavior from the examples above can also be explained by some individuals’ tendency to prefer a 
status quo opposed to a change. To demonstrate this effect, Knetsch and Sinden (1984) and Knetsch 
(1989) used an experiment, in which they randomly gave students either chocolate or decorated mugs. 
Later, each was offered a chance to trade the gift for the other choice. Given that the transaction cost was 
very small, about 90% of students kept their gift. Their behaviors reflected preferences that were induced 
by the initial allocation.  
 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) also obtained the evidence of status quo bias in a field study of the 
choice of medical plans by Harvard employees. They found out that new medical plans are more likely to 
be chosen by new employees even though there is a yearly opportunity to change the decision and 
minimum changing cost. Also, employees favor minor changes over big changes. People who transferred 
from a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan favored a new variant of that plan over other alternatives. Samuelson 
and Zeckhauser also observed that the pension reserves to TIAA and CREF are very stable over years in 
spite of large variation in rate of returns. Loyalty and pioneer company advantage as status quo bias offer 
a good explanation for this phenomenon. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991) mentioned another effect implied by loss aversion – improvement versus 
tradeoff. In one experiment, a group of students was given the gift package of “one free dinner at 
MacArthur Park and a monthly Stanford calendar.” The other group was given “one 8 x 10 professional 
photo portrait and a monthly Stanford calendar.” All of the students were informed that some winners 
would be given the opportunity to exchange their gift with one of the followings: X – two free dinners at 
MacArthur Park Restaurant. Y – one 8 x 10 professional photo portrait plus two 5 x 7 and three wallet 
size prints. As implied by loss aversion, people with the first gift package would be more likely to favor x 
over y than people with second gift package since people are averse to giving up their original gift. The 
results from the test confirmed this implication. 
 
In additional to “status quo bias “and “improvement versus tradeoff”, Tversky and Kahneman (1991) 
introduced another effect of loss aversion – advantage and disadvantage effect. They argued that the 
same difference between two options will be given greater weight if it is a difference of disadvantages 
than if it is a difference of advantages. In an experiment, individuals were given two alternative job 
opportunities x and y then asked to choose one. Both x and y are better than the current one in the aspect 
of social contact and y is the best in this aspect. On the other hand, both x and y are worse than the current 
one in the aspect of travel time and y is the worst in this respect. The result showed that 70 % of 
participants chose x over y, which confirmed the argument that a given difference between two options 
has a bigger impact when the option is a difference between two losses than when it is a difference 
between two gains.  
 
2.2 Diminishing sensitivity 
 
In addition to loss aversion, another important feature of reference dependence is diminishing sensitivity, 
which suggests that the impact of a difference is attenuated when both options are remote from the 
reference point for the relevant dimensions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991). For example, we are more 
sensitive to the difference between 0 and 3 than the difference between 20 and 23. With diminishing 
sensitivity, the slope of a person’s utility function over wealth becomes flatter as his/her wealth gets 
further away from the reference lever (Rabin 1998). Diminishing sensitivity implies that while people are 
likely to be risk averse over gains, they are often risk-loving over losses. An experiment done by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) confirmed this notion. In the experiment, 70 percent of subjects reported 
that they would prefer a lottery with ¾ chance of losing nothing and ¼ chance of losing $6000 to a lottery 
with ½ chance of losing nothing and ¼ chance of losing $4000 and ¼ chance of losing $2000. Because 
the chosen lottery is a mean-preserving spread of the less preferred lottery, behaviors of 70% of subjects 
are not consistent with the standard concavity assumption.  
 
 
3. Change of the reference level 
 
In general, reference level changes are caused by a process of accommodation or adaption (Hoch and 
Loewenstein, 1991). People who are exposed to a persistence stimulus adapt to that stimulus often before 
they realize it. Once the adaption occurs, the reference level is changed.  
 
Mechanisms causing such adaption have been discussed by Hoch and Loewenstein (1991). One 
mechanism is called Physical Proximity, which is considered the most potent cause of reference level 
changes. The effect of physical proximity on impulsivity has been well documented by Mischel (1974). In 
an experiment by Mischel and Grusee (1967), children were put in a room and told that they could call the 
experimenter by ringing the bell. They were given a choice between an immediate reward (a single 
marshmallow) and a delayed reward (two marshmallows). If they could wait for the experimenter to 
return without ringing the bell they were to receive the better reward. The impulsivity level was measured 
by determining how long the subject waited before ringing the bell. The object was placed in front of 
some children, but not others. The result shows that viewing the reward made subjects less willing to 
delay. Thus, placing an object in view leads to a change of reference level.  
 
The second mechanism is called Temporal Proximity1, which implies that the desire of obtaining the 
object increase as the object becomes imminent. Loewenstein (1990) designed an experiment to examine 
the effects of Temporal Proximity. In the experiment, high school sophomores either expected an early 
(e.g. four weeks) or a late delivery (e.g., eight weeks) of a $7 gift certificate from a local record store. 
After two weeks, subjects were given $7 at early date or $8.50 if they delayed until the late date. The 
results have shown that the subjects with expectation of an early delivery are less likely to wait than those 
with expectation of a late delivery, which confirmed the notion that impatience is exacerbated by a 
temporary change of reference level. As mentioned by Hoch and Loewenstein (1991), many marketing 
practices take advantage of this effect to increase impatience by selling imminent opportunity. Examples 
include pizza-delivery services with a promise of a discount if the pizza is not delivered within a certain 
amount of time; toll-free hotline allowing immediate ordering of a product; online ordering with express 
delivery.  
 
The third mechanism mentioned by Hoch and Loewenstein (1991) is Social Comparison. People often 
want what their peers already have and do not wish to wait to obtain the same or similar item for 
themselves. Various studies2 show that people tend to compare themselves with others in many aspects of 
their lives. Knowing their superior peers can trigger a feeling of deprivation and often lead to a higher 
level of impatience. In an experiment by Loewenstein (1990), fifth graders who won a lesser prize of $4 
versus their opponents who won 8$ appeared to be more impatient than subjects who won the same prize, 
but whose opponents won only $2. People who lost were willing to give up more to get the reward 
immediately (.43¢ versus .12¢). The outcome shows that people used their peers’ awards as the standard 
and adapted to a new reference level. Knowing that their opponents have won triggered greater feelings of 
deprivation for the people who lost, thus people who lost became less patient to get the reward than 
winners.  
 
Barken and Busemeyer (1999) discussed the effect of experience on the reference point. In an experiment, 
participants were asked to play a sequence of two identical gambles, where the participant is either going 
to gain $200 or lose $100 with a probability of ½ in each gamble. The participant was first asked to make 
a planned choice about the second gamble. After the first gamble is played, the same participate was 
                         
1 Related literature on the topic includes Ainslie and Haendel (1983), Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil (1987), Chung 
and Herrnstein (1967).  
2 Related studies include Brickman and Bulman (1977), Easterlin (1974), Merton (1968), Stoouffer et al. (1949), 
Zajonc (1968).  
asked to make a final decision on the second gamble. The results showed that the participants’ final 
choice were inconsistent with their plans. Experiencing a gain in the first gamble tends to make the 
participant switch from accepting the second gamble to rejecting it, while experiencing a loss in the first 
gamble tends to make the participant switch from rejecting the second gamble to accepting it. Under the 
circumstance of unknown outcome, the decision is made without incorporating any information in the 
first gamble. Therefore, when the outcome of the first gamble is unknown, the final evaluation is made 
against a current position of zero (because no gain or loss has happened). When the outcome of the first 
gamble is known, the final evaluation is made against a different position corresponding to an actual gain 
or loss in the first gamble. This result implies that the reference points play an important role in the 
evaluation of second gamble.  
 
4. Other explanations for time – inconsistent preferences 
 
The previous sections reviewed the explanations for time – inconsistent preferences by particularly 
focusing on the concept of reference dependence. Another explanation for time – inconsistent behaviors is 
isolation effect by Tversky and Kahneman (1979).  People generally discard components that are shared 
by all prospects under consideration. This tendency leads to time–inconsistent preferences when the same 
choice is presented in different forms. Tversky and Kahneman constructed a two-stage game to 
demonstrate this point. In the first stage, there is a probability of 3/4 to end the game and a probability of 
1/4 to move into the second stage. In the second stage, there are two choices: one is to win $3000 for sure; 
the other is to win $4000 with a probability of 4/5. So the chance to win $4000 is 1/5 and the other chance 
to win $3000 is 1/4. Among 141 subjects, 80 percent chose the first one whereas 65 percent chose the 
latter one if they were just asked to choose between the game 1/4 chance to win $3000 and the game of 
1/5 chance to win $4000. The reason is that after moving into the second stage, the decision maker faces a 
choice between a risky and a riskless prospect. The outcome of winning $3000 has a certainty advantage 
in the sequential game, which does not exist in the one shot game. The outcome indicates that the 
contingent certainty of a fixed return enhances the attractiveness of this option, relative to a risky venture 
with the same probabilities and outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). 
 
5.    Policy implications  
 
Time-inconsistent preferences are observed in behaviors ranging from smoking, drinking, fast food 
consumption to saving money. To remedy or alleviate the problems, the self-control devices such as 
rehabilitation programs and commitment can be used in polices and regulations.  
 
Licenses and taxes are among those forms of self-control that have been utilized as both a source of 
revenue for governments and as a commitment device. However, it is difficult to find a subsidy or tax 
policy that is Pareto efficient (Phelps and Pollak (1968), Goldman (1979)). To address this issue, 
Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2004) suggest alternative taxation polices where smokers could be allowed 
to purchase “smoking licenses” when they start to smoke, and in exchange commit their future selves to 
face compensated cigarette taxes. Their idea is to shift the cost of taxation entirely onto the people with 
the highest willingness to pay, namely younger people, while continuing to target the effect of taxation 
toward the future selves. They have shown that this scheme improves the welfare of current and future 
smokers and generates positive revenue for the government.  
 
In the context of savings, social security has served as a commitment device to prevent poverty among the 
individuals who have insufficient savings during their working years. However, the studies3 have shown 
                         
3 Related studies include Docquier (2002), İmrohoroğlu et al. (2003), Cremer et al. (2008), Bucciol (2008), Kumru 
and Thanopoulos (2008), Findley and Caliendo (2008), Caliendo and Gahramanov (2009), and Findley and Caliendo 
(2009), etc.  
that a social security system with a negative present value cannot be rationalized. Caliendo (2011) 
furthered the study by putting no restriction on discount function and allowing tax and transfer scheme. 
Once again, he has shown that it is impossible for consumer to benefit from participating in a social 
security program with a negative net present value even with tax and transfer scheme.  
 
Self-control models were also utilized to study the issue of privacy protection. Acquisti (2004) has shown 
that it is unlikely for individuals to act rationally when facing privacy sensitive decision. In particular, he 
found that individuals have a tendency to under-protect themselves against privacy risks and over-provide 
personal information. The results suggest that regulative policies may be needed to enforce the liabilities 
and increase individuals’ welfare.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned behaviors, time-inconsistent preferences are also observed in the 
consumption that is related to environment. For example, as the level of pollution increases, it is likely 
that more consumers will choose to consume electricity generated by green energy like wind power and 
solar panel than the electricity generated by fossil fuels. Cropper and Laibson (1998) studied related issue 
in the context of project evaluation. They have shown that by subsidizing the discount rate that is applied 
to environmental projects, the government can help prevent from the overconsumption of the 
environmental goods. 
  
Despite numerous theoretical and experimental papers on time-inconsistent preferences, the research on 
their policy implications is slim. A further analysis on time-inconsistent behaviors and their policy 
implications remains to be done. 
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